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Abstract 
 This thesis attempts to understand the reasons behind Hungary’s surge in 
populism in the years following the 2008 financial crisis. In particular it looks at the two 
major political parties in Hungary, Fidesz and Jobbik, and how they continue to maintain 
control over the Hungarian government despite the common theory that populist support 
deteriorates overtime. A key component of Populism is that it usually grows in times of 
crises. Particularly in Hungary I focus on the many crises that arose during Hungary’s 
turbulent history of occupation, especially their transition out of Communism. Along 
with the devastation caused by the 2008 financial crash. Hungary’s inability to 
completely transition into a full-fledged Democracy as well as the economic devastation 
they witnessed following 2008 has created an environment where Populism can thrive 
indefinitely.  
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Chapter 1: Populist Theories 
 
Populism has recently taken the mainstage as both a growing fear as well as a new 
identity for politicians world-wide. Populism has become something to fear, since the 
rhetoric these rulers use can be incredibly harmful to not only the world as a whole, but 
also citizens within countries with populist leaders. In Romania the minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Teodor Baconschi, stated, “We have some natural, physiological problems, of 
criminality within some of the Romanian communities, especially among the 
communities of the Romanian citizens of Roma ethnicity” (Baconschi 2012). Minister 
Baconschi attempts to garnish hatred for the Roma population1 by explaining their 
ethnicity breeds criminals. Baconschi’s message is extremely common among populist 
leaders. For example, there were remnants of Baconschi’s hate speech when Donald 
Trump announced his candidacy for President he declared, “When Mexico sends its 
people… They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists” (Trump 
2015). President Trump used the same rhetoric of Baconschi to create an enemy that his 
supporters can rally against. These types of hate speeches were common during history’s 
darkest time when Nazi’s equated ethnicity to criminality to justify some of their many 
horrific acts during the Holocaust. Yet this animosity towards different races continues. 
In fact, a major party in the Czech Republic, the National party, utilized a famous Nazi 
quote when they proclaimed, “The final solution to the Gypsy question proposed by the 
                                                        
1 3 percent of the Romanian population are ethnically Roma. While this is not a huge 
percentage of the population, the fact that powerful people are promoting genocide of any 
amount is extremely disturbing. 
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National Party is a blueprint for all European states … STOP! their demanding and 
thieving mentality … We don’t want parasites among us … We protect you and your 
family” (Albert 2012). Political theorists are struggling to understand how this damaging 
rhetoric has returned to the mainstage as populism has garnered so many supporters in the 
modern era. Populism roots itself in the early stages of countries transitioning towards a 
democracy, but now it has sprouted up in long standing democracies with no signs of 
slowing down. A big concern currently is how populism rulers impact a country’s foreign 
relations. This paper uses Hungary as a case study to determine why a populist 
government focused on protectionist and anti-internationalist foreign and domestic policy 
came to be so successful in a world were globalization continues to expand. 
Before further diving into the spread of populism, a clear definition needs to be in 
place. Populism essentially relies on an “Us” Vs. “Them” conflict. With the goal of the 
“Us” to defeat the powerful and corrupt “Them” or Elite. To fully expand this definition, 
Populism requires two core principles, “First, A country’s ‘true people’ are locked into 
conflict with outsiders, including establishment elites. Second, nothing should constrain 
the will of the true people” (Kyle and Gultchin 2018). These principles offer an 
extremely broad definition of populism that is broken down further into three subgroups 
of populism by defining the “true people.” While these specific subgroups of populism 
are important for the database “Populists in Power: 1990–2018”2 for our understanding it 
is unnecessary to define what type of specific populism leaders fall into. Essentially the 
                                                        
2 Populists in power is a database that lists out all of the populist leaders that fit into the 
scope of Kyle and Gultchin’s definition of populism. It also breaks down the specific 
type of populism. The three types of populism are: cultural populism, socio-economic 
populism, and Anti-establishment populism. 
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“true people” can be defined as a large group of people within a country that are 
connected through varying traits that revolve around their hardworking nature as well as 
either their culture or social class. While the definition of the “true people” is open to 
interpretation on a country by country basis the second principle is far more concrete. It is 
the idea that these “true people” are the only group that deserves whatever they view to 
be their way of life, and anything that is preventing this is considered the enemy.  
With this definition it becomes easier to identify countries with an emerging political 
party, or now established populist leader. Such as President Trump in the United States 
and Marine Le Pen and her National Front party in France. Both utilize different 
understandings of the “true people”, but they both focus on identifying the elite as an 
enemy that is infringing upon the “true people’s” right to establish their way of life. By 
focusing on each country’s specific definition of the “true people” the leaders’ efforts are 
solely used to appease their people, which usually leads to anti-internationalist foreign 
policies. Hungary has proven to be a great example of this phenomenon. Viktor Orbán 
along with his party, Fidesz, completely flooded the Hungarian parliament with populism 
and they continue to dominate the scene. Ever since Fidesz became the majority party in 
Hungary it has greatly increased anti-internationalist efforts despite the country’s 
eagerness to join the European Union (EU) back in the early 2000’s.  
Before analyzing Hungary specifically, we need to understand how populism’s 
“Us V. Them” theme has become so common in politics today. Psychologists have been 
uncovering the many downsides of this phenomenon between ingroups and outgroups. 
Groupthink was coined by Irving L. Janis in his book Victims of Groupthink: A 
Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos. In this book Janis defines 
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groupthink as, “A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved 
in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their 
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis 1972). 
Throughout the book Janis uses this definition as an explanation for major political 
fiascos, where a close-knit ingroup as a whole ignored major issues that the individuals 
within the group were concerned for. For example, Janis explains how the Challenger 
Disaster can be attributed to groupthink when extremely bright engineers rescinded their 
concerns about the O-Rings after Nasa personnel dismissed these concerns (Hart 1991). 
Throughout the book Janis demonstrates the strength of groupthink in small ingroups by 
showing how people refused to deviate from the group’s plans no matter how terrible the 
results were.  
While Janis showed one major downfall of groupthink through its impact on 
famous political failures, other studies continue to expand on the many other downsides 
of groupthink. One such study, Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution 
of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups, analyzes how members of the 
ingroup dehumanize the outgroup (Leyens et al 2001). The report includes three studies 
that found members of the ingroup not only apply positive characteristics and traits to 
other members of the ingroup, they also rarely, or even refuse to, consider these 
characteristics for the outgroup. This implies that once an “enemy” or outgroup is created 
it is incredibly easy to make them seem entirely evil. This might explain how political 
leaders, like President Trump, have not faced significant pushback for offensive remarks, 
since his supporters may have significantly dehumanized President Trump’s opponents. 
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While Psychologists continue to explain the strong forces within groupthink, 
political 
theorists attempt to apply these forces to understand how Populism – which utilizes 
ingroup hatred towards the outgroup – has seen an incredible resurgence in an era of 
immense globalization. Many political theorists turn to crises as the major cause for a rise 
in populism.  
An important example being financial or economic crises as the key crisis that 
launched this sudden resurgence of populism, which is not surprising considering the 
damage dealt by the 2008 financial crash. Economic and financial crises have caused 
immense economic distress throughout history, but the collapse of an economy does not 
just impact the financial institutions involved in its regulation. Economic crises have long 
lasting effects that continue to impact and direct a country for years following the crash. 
The 2008/2009 Great Recession was no exception to this and has been used as a cause for 
this massive influx of populism throughout the West (Kriesi and Pappas 2015). This 
paper follows the rise of populism throughout Europe – on a country by country and then 
later a region by region analysis – following the 2008 financial crash. The paper found a 
strong correlation in regions that were hit the hardest by the recession and already had an 
established populist presence. The intuition behind this seems incredibly sound 
considering a rise in economic disparity creates a blatant “elite” against the nation’s “true 
people.” I will expand on this study throughout this paper, considering the paper was 
published in 2015, which I believe was too early to analyze the long-lasting impacts of 
the 2008 recession.  
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While there are many arguments focused on the impact of economic, political, or 
cultural crises for the rise in populism, some political theorists argue the exact opposite. 
They argue that populism within a country helps facilitate and exasperate crises. This 
argument is laid out in Chapter 7 of Benjamin Moffitt’s book, The global rise of 
populism: Performance, political style, and representation. Moffitt argues that Populism 
helps to create an environment where setbacks can turn into major disasters and crises 
quickly. His process highlights populist leaders’ ability to starkly divide the country into 
“the elites” vs. “the people” strongly perpetuates a crisis (Moffitt 2016). Moffitt’s idea 
that populism is not just influenced by crises, but that it can also contribute to their 
devastating success is worrisome. The implications from this idea that populism can help 
breed major disasters needs to be addressed considering the economic crash occurred a 
decade ago, yet populism is continually growing. This paper will attempt to utilize this 
relationship between populism and crises to better understand why Hungary has a strong 
populist government with extremely anti-internationalist beliefs. 
The previous two papers mentioned looked at the rise in populism as a world-
wide phenomenon, but this allows room for error since generalizations will not uncover 
the exact reasons for the populist spike. Just like the Kriesi and Pappas paper mentioned 
there must be far more underlying factors than just an economic crisis considering 
populism overtook some governments while others just saw a slight increase. To better 
understand these differences political theorists, need to analyze populism on a country by 
country basis. A paper by Attila Ágh titled, The Triple Crisis in Hungary: The 
“Backsliding” of Hungarian Democracy After Twenty Years, attempts to uncover how 
Hungary has been so susceptible to this rise in populism due to three past crises. Ágh 
 11 | S t o l a r s k i  
 
uses Hungary to attempt to uncover how it went from the transitional powerhouse in the 
1980’s and 1990’s to the worst performer during the 2008 financial crash. Throughout the 
paper Ágh draws comparisons to the other countries that transitioned from the Warsaw 
Pact to the EU – which he refers to as the “New Member States” – but he refrains from 
coming to generalized conclusions that impact all of these countries and solely focuses on 
why Populism is on the rise in Hungary. Ágh blames the rise in populism on three 
distinct crises that grew together to form a large, diverse group of “absolute” and 
“relative losers” that have supported Fidesz’s aggressive anti-EU stances. The three crises 
include: a social and political crisis when Hungary underwent the rapid democratization 
in the late 1900s, then an adjustment crisis that further developed the impact of the 
previous crisis when Hungary joined the EU, and lastly the 2008 economic crisis fully 
expanded the previous crises by hitting at a time when Hungary’s government and 
economy was incredibly vulnerable (Ágh 2013). Ágh’s argument is incredibly 
convincing especially his focus on the “losers” who coincide with the supporters of 
Fidesz and Jobbik, the two major populist parties in Hungary. Unfortunately, Ágh’s paper 
was written in 2013 and does not help us understand why Fidesz continues to dominate 
the government when populism is usually expected to be a temporary phenomenon. 
 A more recent paper that attempts to uncover why Viktor Orbán, along with the 
rest of his party, continue to easily win elections is titled, Neither episodic, nor destined 
to failure? The endurance of Hungarian populism after 2010, by Robert Csehi. This 
paper analyzes how Fidesz has been able to stay in power despite the idea that for 
populism to succeed long term it needs to constantly reinforce the ingroup vs. outgroup 
mentality that was explained earlier in this chapter. Thus, populism is usually expected to 
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die out rather quickly, because to consistently gain supporters the ingroup needs to 
change and expand to encompass more people while still keeping the same level of 
animosity towards the outgroup. Csehi explains Orbán’s longevity in three parts. First, he 
argues that Orbán was able to “reconstruct ‘the elite’ and ‘the people.’” Secondly, he 
argues that, despite this restructuring, Orbán has been able to “reinforce the antagonistic 
relationship between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people.’ Lastly, he argues that Orbán has pushed 
extensively to “remodel popular sovereignty” since voting rights now extend to 
Hungarians living outside of Hungary (Csehi 2019). Csehi argues these three changes are 
apparent through slight changes in Orbán’s rhetoric as well as some laws he’s passed 
while in power. While the paper lays out strong evidence for differences from when 
Orbán first took office to his most recent reelection in 2018, I could not see the dramatic 
shifts that Csehi was trying to uncover. Csehi argues that Orbán has shifted “the elite” to 
include international entities as opposed to just domestic entities, but Anti-EU 
propaganda has been successful prior to 2010. He also argues that the ingroup has 
changed to be sovereign nations, but the extreme racism throughout Hungary’s 
government persists that ethnic Hungarians are the “true people.” Thus, I diverge from 
Csehi’s belief that major changes in Orbán’s rhetoric has allowed for the continuation of 
populism in Hungary and follow the crisis approach as well as a lack of complete 
transition as the reasons for this continuation of populism in Hungary. 
 This paper is structured as follows. In Chapter two there is a brief overview of the 
two major populist parties in Hungary, Fidesz and Jobbik, that includes their impressive 
rise to power. The next two chapters attempt to uncover where the supporters of these 
populist parties came from and why they persist. Whether it is due to the lack of complete 
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democratization when Hungary is compared to other nations – which will be covered in 
Chapter three, or if it is due to Hungary losing out during the 2008 financial crash – 
which will be covered in Chapter four. 
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Chapter 2: The Surge of Hungarian Populism 
 
 Hungary is now home to two major, populist political parties, Fidesz and Jobbik. 
While these parties’ platforms, representation in government, and ideologies differ 
significantly there are still many similarities, like their anti-internationalist beliefs, that 
continue to strengthen the populist movement within Hungary. The reason that these 
parties are still prevalent this late after the 2008 economic crash is a testament to their 
supporters. This chapter will provide an in-depth look at the sudden rise of populism as 
well as identify who has helped promote this movement. 
 The Hungarian Civil Alliance, better known as Fidesz, has been around since the 
first democratic election in Hungary following the fall of the Soviet Union. Fidesz 
originated as an anticommunist party desperate to boost the economy through European 
integration. Surprisingly their messages have changed dramatically following their rise to 
power in Hungary’s government. 
Fidesz has been incredibly successful in recent elections, and their rise to power 
has occurred over a short period of time. The party began gaining traction in the 1990 
election when they had their first major victory securing 8.95% of the vote and winning 
21 seats in parliament. Fidesz maintained this success until they grew exponentially in the 
1998 election. In 1998 they secured 29.48% of the votes, granting them 148 seats in 
parliament. This election also marked the first term of many for Fidesz’s leader, Viktor 
Orbán, who assumed the Prime Minister of Hungary’s office on July 6, 1998. Although 
Orbán would go on to lose the 2002 and 2006 elections, Fidesz continued to influence 
parliament winning 188 seats in 2002 and 164 in 2006. Orbán returned to office in 2010, 
and alongside Fidesz, continues to dominate Hungary’s government. Fidesz earned about 
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50% of the popular vote in the 2010, 2014, and 2018 elections. Fidesz’s rapid rise to 
power is impressive especially considering the relatively high voter turnout rates in 
Hungary, which averaged to about 66% each year (The National Election Office 2018).3 
Although Fidesz originated as an EU supporter, this support has quickly 
diminished following Hungary’s integration into the EU, since the EU is now a member 
of Fidesz’s “outgroup.” Prior to EU integration Fidesz touted integration as a way to 
boost Hungary’s economy and provide a strong security interest considering Hungary’s 
location in Europe. However, this rhetoric has dramatically changed as Fidesz’s beliefs 
are starting to directly conflict with EU principles. For example in March of 2019, there 
was an outcry of other members of the European People’s Party (EPP) to revoke Fidesz’s 
membership, which eventually lead to the EPP suspending Fidesz’s party membership 
until further notice (Bayer and Cokelaere 2019). Although Fidesz has not officially left 
the EPP their rhetoric continues to focus on Hungary first, which is a major reason for 
their suspension in the first place. Fidesz continues to focus on reviving Hungary’s 
economy as well as increase border security, but the party now looks inwards towards 
Hungary itself as opposed to the EU for help.  
While Fidesz dominates Hungary’s political landscape as a well-established 
populist party in Hungary, the Movement for a Better Hungary, better known as Jobbik, 
is slightly less prevalent – albeit far more extreme – than their political counterparts 
Fidesz. While Fidesz claims to be a center-right party, Jobbik has made their far-right 
                                                        
3 The National Election office provided the election data. The data includes the raw 
number of votes received by each party in both the parliament and prime minister 
elections. It also breaks down the numbers by region to highlight what parties won each 
region. 
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status abundantly clear. Despite some major differences though both parties have grown 
incredibly quickly since they were founded and share many similar ideas about foreign 
politics. 
Jobbik emerged in 2006 under the leadership of Gábor Vona who quickly turned 
the young party into a political powerhouse (Jobbik 2019). In 2006 Jobbik earned only 
2.2% of the vote, which did not even qualify them for a parliamentary seat. However, 
they quickly rose in the polls shooting up to 16.67% of the vote, earning 47 seats in 2010, 
and 20.22% of the vote, earning 23 seats in 2014 (National Election Office).4 They have 
continued to gain support in Hungary, and following the 2018 elections they secured their 
place as the second largest political party in Hungary by earning 19.63% of the vote, 
which earned them 25 seats in Parliament. Now 159 out of the 199 seats in Hungary’s 
parliament are occupied by members of strong populist parties (Schuman 2018). 
Unlike Fidesz, Jobbik has never shown any favor to European integration or any 
other institution that could infringe upon Hungarian sovereignty, and takes an incredibly 
conservative stand in all political debates. Their core values revolve around securing 
Hungarian culture for Hungarians living within the country and abroad. These 
Hungarians are the “true people” in the eyes of Jobbik. The “elites” that are encroaching 
on the “true people” include the government that – in their eyes – has failed severely to 
protect Hungarian sovereignty by blindly agreeing to EU controls. Other members of the 
“elites” or “outgroup” include immigrants, gypsies, as well as corrupt government 
                                                        
4 The National Election office provided the election data. The data includes the raw 
number of votes received by each party in both the parliament and prime minister 
elections. It also breaks down the numbers by region to highlight what parties won each 
region. 
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officials (Jobbik 2019).5 Thus to achieve their goals Jobbik takes a similar “Hungary 
first” stance like Fidesz. 
Jobbik and Fidesz are not only strong parties in Hungary they also have a notable 
presence in the European parliament. Of the 21 European Parliament seats dedicated to 
Hungary, Jobbik and Fidesz occupy a combined 12 of those seats. While this may not 
seem like a significant number of seats considering the European Parliament houses 750 
members, it shows that over half of Hungary’s voice in international politics is controlled 
by strong populist parties (European Union Election Results 2019).6 
This significant and consistent rise in political dominance is extremely surprising 
for any political party, but especially for a populist surge considering claims that 
populism cannot last once in power. One such claim comes from the book, Democracies 
and the Populist Challenge, by Yves Mény and Yves Surel argues that once in power 
Populism struggles to survive. The book describes the struggles many populist leaders 
face while in office, such as the corralling of their “true people” despite lack of success 
opposing the “elites” (Meny and Surel). However, Fidesz and Jobbik have somehow 
managed to overcome these problems, considering after years of controlling Hungary’s 
government they show no sign of slowing down. A key reason for this is the strength of 
                                                        
5 Jobbik’s website lists their major policy focuses all of which focus heavily on 
maintaining Hungarian norms throughout Europe and Hungary. They preach stability and 
returning to “old values” incredibly often. Some major policy focuses include ending 
corruption, restarting Hungary’s industry production, ensuring ethnic groups do not get a 
free pass due to their ethnicity. 
6 The EU breaks down the 750 seats by international parties, countries, and then sub-
parties that are members of the international parties. Fidesz is a member of the 
international party the EPP, while Jobbik is not a member of any international party. 
These international parties could play a major role in securing seats, and are likely a 
reason that Fidesz holds eleven seats while Jobbik only won one. 
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the Fidesz and Jobbik voters. Hungary is home to one major city, Budapest, that has a 
large economy, prominent academic institutions, and a diverse population. However, 
outside of Budapest the rural countryside has none of these perks, and struggles with 
perpetual unemployment due to a lack of opportunities and a lack of training resources. 
These Hungarians struggling to survive in the countryside have looked towards Fidesz 
and Jobbik as the only solution to their problems. Their anti-internationalist ideology 
helps push out potential competitors coming from both inside and out of the EU. In fact, 
Fidesz won every region in Hungary except for Budapest in the 2018 elections (National 
Election Office 2018). The reason they are clinging on to these ideologies will be further 
explained in the following chapters, which help outline the painful history these citizens 
have experienced.  
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Chapter 3: The Side Effects of Rushed Democratization 
 
 Hungary has a turbulent, albeit interesting, history that is present throughout the 
entire country. Hungary has a long history of foreign occupation, which can be seen from 
the many Roman ruins that are scattered throughout the countryside as well as the many 
monuments to Soviet leaders that fill Memento Park. While thousands of pages have been 
written on the long history of Hungary, for this paper we are only concerned with the 
decades following World War II. The past century has shaped the Hungarian borders 
along with the lives of the people within those borders. 
Following the second World War, Hungary’s main duty was to diligently serve as 
an extension of the Russian Federation’s economy. During the Soviet occupation of 
Hungary, Hungarian needs were ignored as its agricultural production failed, political 
systems were ignored, and police brutality skyrocketed. All of which led into the huge 
reduction in Hungarian’s standard of living, while the rest of the Soviet Union used their 
Uranium to increase production (Vardy and Barany 2019). The pain and suffering 
Hungarian’s experienced during this occupation came to a climax during the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956. Insurgents in Budapest, finally fed up with the communist police 
violent tactics and desperate to abandon the Warsaw Pact, staged an uprising. The 
insurgents gained control of Budapest, but their success was short lived as nearly 6,000 
Soviet Tanks flooded the city killing more than 30,000 people. The rebellion was 
demolished along with the dreams of free elections and abandoning the Soviet Union 
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(BBC “History Files” 2011)7. While this is the most gruesome example of the Soviet 
Union’s way of ruling with an Iron fist it is far from the only one as thousands of citizens 
were captured, interrogated, displaced, and killed throughout the 1900s without any 
evidence of their anti-communist beliefs, which was the reason for their persecution in 
the first place. Hungarians lived in a constant state of fear of their government and its 
secret police during this time, but the end was near as the fall of the Soviet Union was 
imminent. 
Hungary officially rid itself of foreign control on June 19, 1991 when the last of 
the Soviet Union’s troops returned to Russia. The political and economic transformations 
to prepare Hungary for life outside of the Soviet Union began years earlier when it was 
obvious the Warsaw Pact was doomed. The transition in Hungary began in 1988 under 
then Prime Minister, Miklós Németh. At that point Prime Minister Németh’s main focus 
was transitioning towards a democratic political system in the most peaceful way 
possible. To do this he constructed a national roundtable discussion to determine how the 
country should proceed. This national roundtable consisted of negotiations among the 
political and social elites in Hungary including many communist sympathizers. While 
this caused a lot of issues down the line it led to a significant amount of political, social, 
and economic reform that continues to impact Hungary today (BBC News 2012).8  
                                                        
7 This BBC Movie is the first part of their Cold War series produced by the BBC. It 
includes detailed first-hand accounts of life during the cold war, and even a thirty-minute 
segment with footage from the 1956 Revolution in Budapest.  
8 The facts from the above paragraph come from BBC News’ detailed compilation of 
Hungary’s history broken down by major periods from the original founding of Hungary 
by a group of Tribesmen to the present day. 
 21 | S t o l a r s k i  
 
Although political reform is still ongoing in Hungary today, there were significant 
changes made thanks to the roundtable discussions back in the late 1980s. The first major 
change was creating a Parliamentary system of government that employed 386 members. 
These members were elected through a system of free voting that had not been seen in 
Hungary since the Warsaw Pact. The roundtable also prompted massive constitutional 
changes to be made in 1988 and 1990. The original government created by the 
roundtables allocated a lot of power to parliament and the constitutional court, but slowly 
power has shifted towards the once weak position of Prime Minister. Power has been 
shifting towards the Prime Minister ever since the roundtable discussions, because major 
changes are constantly being implemented. Unlike many established democracies with a 
strong constitution, Hungary’s constitution can be revised, and shockingly in 2010 it was 
completely changed following the parliamentary elections that year. Further changes in 
the government have altered the number of parliament members from 386 to the current 
199 as well as decreasing the number of constitutional judges from 15 to 11 (Gallai 
2018). These are just a couple examples of the significant changes Hungary has made to 
its government, since it was freed from the Soviet Union, but these changes highlight 
how the country is still in a transitional period that has yet to realize itself as an 
established Democracy. 
These massive political transitions directly impacted the many social changes 
Hungary saw after they left the Warsaw Pact. These social changes are most apparent 
through the massive differences between the older generations that lived through 
communism and the younger generations that see communism as a problem of the past. 
The biggest impact being personal privacy. During the transition citizens were expected 
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to forget the crimes the communist party committed just for the hope of a smooth 
transition. This meant politicians who had people kidnapped, tortured, and eventually 
killed were now running for elected positions. Privacy was the difference between life 
and death under communism, and now these dark secrets were being swept under the rug 
in the hopes for a smooth transition. Millions of persecuted Hungarians still await justice 
they may never receive, and this has laid a foundation of secrecy (especially in politics) 
among the older generation that is usually ignored by the younger generation. This is 
apparent in anti-government protests throughout Budapest led by young students and 
professionals who do not remember the punishments for such acts during the communist 
era (John and Keleti 2018). Had the transition not swept the crimes of the past under the 
rug then maybe distrust of authority would not be as present as it is today. 
This distrust allowed populism to spread incredibly quickly and efficiently 
throughout Hungary. With so much distrust of authority it was incredibly easy for 
populist groups to rise through the ranks making claims of corruption and malpractice 
throughout the government, since they could easily back up their claims with crimes of 
the past. When Fidesz and Jobbik were growing they implemented these practices of 
claiming that the current government is not working with their constituents’ best interest 
at heart. An example of a populist party utilizing this mistrust to gain supporters is shown 
through the following quotation that prefaces Jobbik’s policies. In the first paragraph 
Jobbik complains, “[Hungary’s] subservient foreign policy leaders, who were trying to 
comply with any external demands, missed the historic opportunities entailed by the 
changing balance of international (and European) powers, thus entering into a bargaining 
process contrary to the interest of the nation. Hungary's sovereignty was shaken” (Jobbik 
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2019). This quotation highlights how Jobbik frames their political values and how they 
justify their extremist viewpoints as the only solution to regaining Hungarian sovereignty. 
They play perfectly off of the distrust of government that flourished during the Soviet 
Union. This framework solidifies their “true people” as well as the “evil elites.” It 
separates Jobbik members from both the Hungarian government as well as the European 
Parliament who they claim are suppressing Hungary’s development. Through this 
rhetoric Jobbik has been able to amass a strong following of the individuals who still 
remember the horrific practices that the Hungarian government followed when they were 
a puppet of the Soviet Union, and it brings about fears that the EU is just another puppet 
master exploiting their significant control over Hungary.  
While it is extremely unlikely that the EU will revert back to the horrific 
kidnappings and interrogations during the Soviet Union, the EU has proven to Hungary 
that they are willing to impose their will when they need to. This fear of strong arming by 
the EU has secured populism’s anti-internationalist policies throughout Hungary, since it 
continues to play off of the skepticism of foreign entities created during the Soviet 
occupation of Hungary. Thus, populist parties continue to frame the EU as another 
member of the outgroup that looks to attack Hungary. This can best be explained through 
Orbán’s speech following Fidesz’s many victories during the elections to the European 
Parliament. Orbán ends his congratulatory speech by warning, “Europe is our home, but 
Hungary is our homeland. Never forget that Hungary comes first… We Hungarians never 
forget that we can be only be successful together and in unity. If we pay heed to this fact, 
then we can make Hungary great once again.” (Orbán 2014). This quotation best 
describes Orbán and Fidesz’s relationship with the European Parliament which has 
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severely deteriorated. Populist parties like Fidesz and Jobbik are always looking towards 
promoting their “ingroup” especially when it means bringing down the “outgroup” which 
is the EU in this case. By taking advantage of the distrust, Fidesz and Jobbik have made 
the EU a strong member of their “outgroup.” 
 While Fidesz and Jobbik have successfully built a strong “ingroup” and 
“outgroup” through the distrust of authority that came from their unique history, the 
reason their message is so well received is because Hungarian democratization is far from 
complete. Hungary along with the other emerging governments that transitioned from 
communism to democracy utilized “shock therapy”9 in both their economic as well as 
political transformations. While the economic impacts of this program will be explained 
further in the following chapter, the political consequences of quick and drastic 
democratization do are very unique compared to the rise of democracy in other countries 
throughout history. Hungary is one of the few countries that was able to transition into a 
democracy without immense violence. There is countless literature that covers the 
immense violence that precedes successful democratization (Klopp and Zuern 2007), yet 
Hungary was somehow able to avoid this influx of violence.10 Unfortunately, by avoiding 
                                                        
9 For more information regarding “shock therapy” please refer to Peter Murrell’s, What is 
shock therapy? What did it do in Poland and Russia? In this book Murrell explains the 
key processes of “Shock therapy” as well as how Poland and Russia went about this 
major shift. 
10 For more information on why violence occurs in the democratic process please refer 
future readings to Jacqueline M. Klopp and Elke Zuern’s book, The Politics of Violence 
in Democratization: Lessons from Kenya and South Africa. This book attempts to 
uncover why large-scale violence erupts and then dissolves prior to the implementation of 
Democracy. The pattern of intense violence prior to a democratic regime taking over has 
occurred countless times throughout history, but is vacant in most recent years of all the 
countries that transitioned from Communism to Democracy. 
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this violence Hungary skipped a key path towards Democratization, and for that reason 
should still be considered a transitional government. Under Orbán’s rule Hungary looks 
more like an authoritarian regime than a democracy, since it is missing fair elections. 
Hungary is home to countless political parties with great ideas, but these parties have 
floundered when competing with populist parties like Fidesz and Jobbik. This is due to 
the fact that Fidesz controls the media in Hungary, and only promotes messages that align 
with their anti-internationalist agenda. While there is no direct voter manipulation by 
changing vote counts, populism is under no threat since it is the only message voters are 
getting in the lead up to an election. This has allowed Fidesz and Jobbik to confidently 
spread their racist and anti-internationalist agenda without the fear of backlash from 
opposing parties. There is no sign of populism slowing down in Hungary, because 
populism thrives in transitional governments that have not yet established themselves as a 
full-fledged Democracy.  
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Chapter 4: The Long-Standing Impacts of the Economic Crisis 
 
Although the lack of a complete democratic transition within Hungary is an enticing 
explanation for the success of populism throughout the country, it does not explain the 
full story on how this anti-internationalist agenda continues to dominant the political 
scene. While a lack of democratization set the scene for populism to take over the 
transitional government, the economic crisis in 2008 put the nail in the coffin for populist 
competitors. Not only did it completely devastate Hungary’s economy, it also allowed 
Orbán and Fidesz an easy access to power, since many people were blaming the socialist 
leaders in power during the economic crash. 
The papers mentioned in the first chapter highlight the common belief that the 2008 
economic recession is a key reason for the sudden surge in populism throughout Europe. 
Nearly every country in Europe found itself hosting a new populist party that continued 
to gain supporters following the great recession, which is argued to have impacted 
Europe in three different ways (Shambaugh 2012). First, there was a banking crisis, 
where banks did not have the capital to face the high liquidity demands they were seeing. 
Second, there was a sovereign debt crisis, where countries desperate to gain additional 
funds had to do so under crippling rates and increased foreign influences. Third, there 
was a growth crisis, where competition ceased throughout Europe as penny pinching sky 
rocketed.  
Hungary was one of the unlucky few that faced each of the three major crises and 
continues to this day to struggle to recover from the devastation. Hungary’s GDP growth 
plummeted to -6.7%, the HUF exchange rate rose by about 18%, unemployment rose by 
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2.2%, and government debt rose to nearly 85% of GDP (OECD 2012 and 2019)11. 
Unsurprisingly, everyone was struggling in Hungary during the Great Recession, and the 
government was taking on an influx of debt to combat the financial pain felt throughout 
the country. Unfortunately, there has been little marked improvement. Government debt 
is still extremely high, Hungarian currency still struggles to maintain its value, and the 
strength of the workforce has yet to recover.  
All of this devastation caused by the Great Recession in Hungary is actually 
surprising considering Hungary’s economic position following their departure from the 
Warsaw Pact. In a few short years Hungary transformed from the most promising of the 
emerging economies into a desperate beggar pleading with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for support. The reason that the country took such a dramatic turn can only 
be understood through a brief history of Hungary’s economic transition out of 
Communism.  
Hungary’s transition from a planned economy into a market economy caused 
immense hardship that was believed to only have a significant impact in the short-term. 
The transition was a completely new endeavor not just for Hungary and the other 
emerging countries, but for the world on a whole. No entity prior to 1990 had made such 
a massive transformation from full employment, strict price/wage controls, and intense 
public control of the economy into a market economy essentially overnight. This caused 
                                                        
11 Two OECD datasets were used here. One completed in 2012 that went back 5 years as 
well as one completed in 2019 that went back 5 years. The dataset is extremely detailed 
with economic indicators for nearly every possible section of the economy. The key 
statistics I utilized where the GDP growth indicators, labor statistics, and government 
revenue and expenditures.  
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unemployment to sky rocket as companies needed to focus on profitability as opposed to 
output. Prices and inflation skyrocketed as price controls were removed and companies 
shifted hands to the highest bidder. All of these consequences left ordinary Hungarians 
scrambling to find food and work, but the transition that continues to impact Hungary 
today is how the government handled privatization (Gallai 2018). 
While other countries transitioning towards capitalism focused on keeping 
industries and companies owned by their countries’ citizens, Hungary focused on the path 
that would grant their government the most capital to help feed their growing debt 
portfolio. For example, Czechoslovakia followed a voucher system where every citizen 
was granted a specific number of vouchers that could be traded in for shares of 
companies. Programs like the voucher system, which was also utilized in Russia, allowed 
for poor citizens to regain command of companies they had worked at for decades 
throughout the 1900s. This process slowly shifted major industries from government 
control back into the hands of their constituents. Hungary had a major issue with this 
system, which was its lack of a revenue stream. Hungary had massive amounts of 
outstanding debts to fund growth, but the country still needed more capital to help ease 
the intense transition. To acquire more capital Hungary decided to sell government 
owned industries to the highest bidders. The only problem here is that the highest bidders 
were all foreign investors. No Hungarians could compete with the prices foreign 
investors were throwing around, which caused ordinary citizens immense hardship as 
these new owners came in and shredded the business to become as profitable as possible. 
So many lost their jobs and saw immense poverty in a matter of months (Gallai 2018).  
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Not only did these cash sales hurt Hungarians in the short-term they continue to 
impact Hungary today. The transitional government costed the country millions of dollars 
in long run economic profits, since it sold their most profitable industries and companies 
to the highest bidder during the 1990’s. During this governmental purge foreign investors 
were even able to purchase Hungary’s utility companies. This was easily Hungary’s most 
profitable sector under communism, and the long-term profits lost in these quick cash 
sales continue to stifle Hungarian growth. Hungary is still trying to write these wrongs of 
privatization with massive policies favoring domestic production, increasing foreign 
banking and energy sector regulations, but foreign investment still continues to be a key 
reason for growth throughout Hungary (Gallai 2018).  
Much like the political transition, the economic transition was also a major factor 
for significant cultural differences between the younger and older generations. The 
consequences of the “shock therapy” policies employed by Hungary to transition from 
communism to capitalism led to huge cultural shifts. Under communism there was a 
massive welfare state that ensured support for impoverished members of society, but this 
state collapsed during the transition. This collapse left many struggling for food and 
shelter with no end in sight. The quick and seemingly perfect solution to ease these 
economic burdens was to join the EU as quickly as possible, which is exactly what 
Hungary did. 
 The major “shock therapy” employed in the 1990’s did accomplish its intended 
goal of Westernization which was officially recognized as complete in 2004 when 
Hungary joined the EU along with 7 other countries, many of which were previously 
apart of the Warsaw Pact (Zeptar 2009). Joining the EU was supposed to be the saving 
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grace for Hungary, since it would allow for easier loan agreements as well as an increase 
in infrastructure investment that would help build up Hungary’s economy. Unfortunately, 
the EU rushed into their expansion and did not follow The Copenhagen criteria that was 
agreed upon for future EU growth. The Copenhagen criteria is a set of strict guidelines 
that potential countries must meet or exceed in order to be eligible to join the EU. These 
guidelines focus on democratic principles as well as free market structures (European 
Council 1993).12 Although the EU expresses that these criteria are extremely stringent, 
they relaxed many of the rules during the 2004 expansion. For example, Hungary was 
allowed to enter even though: their new political system was incredibly weak and still 
dramatically changing, their market economy was still emerging and plumped up solely 
through foreign investment and loans, and worst of all they still had strong human rights 
violations occurring towards their Roma population. In a desperate attempt to strengthen 
the West following the Cold War the EU took on eight transitioning countries that needed 
far more time to develop before they were ready to be a useful member of the EU.  
 While Hungary’s economic problems seemed to disappear following their entry to 
the EU, this improvement would be destroyed in the 2008 financial crash. The EU 
allowed Hungary to continue their practices of selling off industries to the highest foreign 
bidders as well as take on extensive loans, since they now had the backing of a global 
superpower in the EU. Thus, at first Hungary’s economy looked incredibly promising, 
and stood out significantly among the other eight expansion countries. For example, 
Germany began building car manufacturing plants in Hungary’s countryside to combat 
                                                        
12 For a list of the specific criteria the EU considers please refer to Article 49 of the 1992 
Treaty of Maastricht. 
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the high percent of unemployment plaguing the surplus of unskilled labor found there. 
Along with decreasing unemployment, Hungary was able to expand their welfare 
programs through massive government expenditures funded in the forms of loans and 
gifts from other EU members.  
Unfortunately, all of the economic progress Hungary made following their 
integration into the EU came to a crashing halt in 2008 when they came begging the IMF 
for support. Many of their initiatives backfired especially using foreign currency loans to 
fund government spending. These loans needed to be paid back in foreign currency, so 
Hungary was unable to easily pay them off by decreasing the value of their HUF. This 
prompted huge cuts in funding and forced them to look towards the IMF for guidance and 
relief. The IMF relief package came with immense government stipulations that still to 
this day control Hungary’s government expenditures and economic policy (IMF Reports 
2005-2019).13 The 2008 crash was incredibly devastating for Hungary and reverted all of 
the significant changes that integration into the EU was supposed to solve, and left many 
economic losers that now looked towards populism for help. 
The 2008 crash highlighted all of the major mistakes made during the reforms of 
the 1990s by extrapolating on the damage these reforms inflicted on Hungary. For the 
first time in a long time unskilled labor was looking back towards the good old days of 
Communism where everyone had a job and could afford basic necessities. This was due 
                                                        
13 The IMF keeps extensive records on all the countries they have provided relief 
packages to. Their reports on Budapest go back to 1985, but for the use of this paper I 
only utilized information from 2005 on. This showed Hungary’s economic standing 
under both Orbán and the socialist leaders before him. For a list of the specific IMF 
guidelines please refer to their country profile of Hungary. 
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to the economic recession that devastated the Hungarian workforce. Hungary was already 
known for its weak employment levels, but now systemic unemployment was at an all-
time high. Leading up to the recession the Hungarian government did not look to increase 
training and education throughout the country they focused more on increasing 
production. This helped drive their economy in the short-term by utilizing the significant 
amount of unskilled labor in Hungary. However, they failed in the long-term, because 
when the economic crash occurred and jobs were cut, it left more unskilled labor with no 
place to turn. These unskilled workers became the biggest losers of the economic 
recession, as well as the biggest supporters of Hungarian populism.  
The unskilled labor that was left unemployed and hungry following the reforms of 
the 1990s grew substantially after the 2008 economic crash and now make up a huge 
number of Fidesz and Jobbik supporters due to their fears of foreign competition. Both 
parties utilize this fear of foreign competitors as a huge way to garner votes. The most 
important way this manifests itself is through the anti-immigration policies pushed 
forward by both parties. Despite significant pushback from the European Parliament, 
Orbán was able to build a massive fence along Hungary’s border to quell the flow of 
immigrants coming from the Middle East. Orbán even laid out a seven-point anti-
migration plan in the lead up to the European Parliament elections that coincide with his 
hopes to have an anti-immigration majority within the EU (Orbán 2019). Policies like 
these grant Fidesz and Jobbik continuous flows of support, since the unskilled labor 
views immigration as a massive threat to their jobs and way of life. Unskilled labor is 
consistently the group most hurt by globalization, so they demand anti-internationalist 
policies that would protect them from a “race to the bottom” in labor standards (Singh 
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and Zammit 2004).14 This influx of unskilled labor paired with the distrust of government 
agents and lack of complete democratization, discussed in the last chapter, has created a 
perfect environment for populism to thrive, and is the reason there is no end in sight for 
Fidesz and Jobbik. 
  
  
                                                        
14 For more information regarding the concept of race to the bottom please refer to 
Labour Standards and the ‘Race to the Bottom’: Rethinking Globalization and Workers’ 
Rights from Developmental and Solidaristic Perspectives, by Ajit Singh and Ann 
Zammit. This paper outlines the fears of unskilled labor that their jobs will be outsourced 
to the cheapest conditions. The authors also attempt to offer solutions and benefits of this 
phenomenon. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and Moving Forward 
 
 Populism has become common place in political debates following the 2008 
financial crash. The rhetoric and ideologies surrounding populism are hard to universally 
define, but they always revolve around fear. By playing off of the fear of the unknown 
many nations have reverted to protectionist policies that attempt to erase the current era 
of globalization. By giving into this fear countries like Hungary are now run entirely by 
populist parties. The two major parties in Hungary, Fidesz and Jobbik, have transformed 
a promising EU member into a country terrified of change. While Fidesz and Jobbik 
continue to dominate Hungary’s government they are distancing themselves from the 
European Parliament with their “Hungary first” ideology. Despite this “Hungary first” 
mentality, Hungary has not significantly improved under populist control, so the 
persistence of this populism is incredibly confusing. 
 Populism is believed to die out once it takes control of the government for many 
reasons, but Hungary has proven to be immune to this phenomenon. There is no end in 
sight for Fidesz or Jobbik as each party continues to garner more and more votes every 
election. The reason these parties continue to dominate is due to the many crises that have 
occurred in Hungary in recent years. In the past 30 years Hungary has witnessed intense 
government corruption, “shock therapy” as they transitioned from Communism to a 
Democratic market economy, integration into the EU, and the largest recession since the 
Great Depression. All of these events have greatly impacted Hungary as a whole and 
have allowed populism to fester. 
 The intense corruption Hungary experienced under Communism created an 
omnipresent distrust of authority. This distrust of authority has been utilized as a key 
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resource of Fidesz and Jobbik to create an international “outgroup” that has helped them 
push their anti-internationalist agenda. By playing off of the fear of losing Hungarian 
sovereignty they have made the EU a pivotal member of the “outgroup” as Fidesz and 
Jobbik slowly distance Hungary from the EU. 
 While distrust of authority created strong “outgroups,” the “shock therapy” in the 
1990s made Hungary skip important steps in democratization. By skipping these steps 
populism has been able to survive, since Hungary is not yet a full-fledged Democracy. 
Hungary remains a transitional government, which is known to be the best environment 
for populism to thrive. The lack of violence in Hungary’s democratization allowed Fidesz 
to take control of the media and prevent free elections. Hungarian media only pushes 
populist ideology and has stifled the spread of any and all political opposition. 
 Hungary’s transitional status has allowed populism to survive, but the major 
mistakes leading up to the 2008 financial crisis paired with the devastation caused by the 
crisis has allowed populism to flourish. Hungary’s desperation to join the EU in 2004 
made them cut corners that valued quick returns over long-term gains. These policies 
made Hungary incredibly vulnerable to the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, the 
financial crisis hit Hungary hard. It destroyed the working class and created a plague of 
economic “losers” that fear the competition globalization brings. The “losers” of the 
economic recession have become the biggest supporters of the protectionist policies that 
Fidesz and Jobbik are pushing through parliament. 
 All of these reasons have combined to create the perfect environment for 
populism to grow within Hungary. However, these reasons are fairly specific to Hungary, 
and cannot give the full picture of the worldwide surge of populism. This means that 
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there is a need for future studies analyzing the reasons behind the spread of populism. 
Especially looking at the rise of populism throughout the other Central and Eastern 
European Countries that transitioned out of Communism during the 1990s. Specifically 
Poland’s new ruling party, the Law and Justice (PiS) party, and how they were able to 
take control of the government in recent years. Further studies to uncover overarching 
reasons for the sudden surge in populism could hopefully predict the downfall of 
populism, but at this point there is no end in sight as fear mongering continues to 
dominate the political scene.  
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